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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge. 
 
The question before us is whether the District Court 
erred as a matter of law in holding that language contained 
in a debt collection letter, which notified the debtor that his 
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account has been placed with the debt collector for 
"immediate collection," and that it "shall afford [the debtor] 
the opportunity to pay this bill immediately and avoid 
further action against you," did not overshadow or 
contradict the required validation notice under 15 U.S.C. 
S 1692g(a) and, therefore, did not confuse or mislead the 
"least sophisticated debtor" as to his statutory rights under 
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to validate and 
dispute the debt. The debtor has also asked this court to 
certify a class under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3) which 
would allegedly consist of similarly situated debtors, i.e., 
debtors who received the same debt collection letter from 
the debt collector. 
 
Because we do not find any violation of section 1692g 
here, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
Accordingly, we need not reach the debtor's request for 
class certification. 
 
I. 
 
On or about September 1, 1998, defendant Quadramed 
Corporation ("Quadramed" or the "debt collector"), on behalf 
of Robert Wood Johnson Memorial Hospital (the "creditor"), 
sent to the plaintiff, George Wilson ("Wilson" or the 
"debtor"), a one-page letter notifying him that it was 
attempting to collect a debt he allegedly owed to the 
hospital for almost two years. The body of the letter 
contains three paragraphs which read as follows: 
 
        Our client has placed your account with us for 
       immediate collection. We shall afford you the 
       opportunity to pay this bill immediately and avoid 
       further action against you. 
 
        To insure immediate credit to your account, make 
       your check or money order payable to ERI. Be sure to 
       include the top portion of this statement and place 
       your account number on your remittance. 
 
        Unless you notify this office within 30 days after 
       receiving this notice that you dispute the validity of 
       this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume 
       this debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing 
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       within 30 days from receiving this notice, this office 
       will obtain verification of the debt or obtain a copy of 
       a judgement and mail you a copy of such judgement or 
       verification. If you request this office in writing within 
       30 days after receiving this notice this office will 
       provide you with the name and address of the original 
       creditor, if different from the current creditor. 
 
All three paragraphs are printed in the same font, size and 
color type-face. Approximately two inches above the body of 
the letter with a flush right margin appears,"THIS IS AN 
ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT. ANY INFORMATION 
OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR THAT PURPOSE." In 
addition, the letter provides the debt collector's name and 
address, the creditor's name, the date of service, balance 
due and client account number. The letter closes with the 
name of the Accounts Representative and her telephone 
number. All of this information, other than the body of the 
letter, is typed in all capital letters. 
 
Wilson filed a purported class action suit, alleging that 
the debt collection letter violates section 1692g of the Fair 
Debt Collection Practices Act ("the Act"), 15 U.S.C. S 1692g. 
Quadramed filed a motion to dismiss Wilson's complaint 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Wilson filed a cross motion 
for partial summary judgment on liability and for class 
certification. 
 
The District Court, in a letter opinion dated August 25, 
1999, granted Quadramed's motion to dismiss and denied 
Wilson's motion for partial summary judgment and for 
class certification. The District Court held that the "format 
of the letter does not obscure the plaintiff 's rights under 
the statute." Wilson v. Quadramed Corporation , No. 99-CV- 
95, Letter Order at 7 (D. N.J. Aug. 25, 1999) ("Letter 
Order"). In this regard, the District Court found that the 
"validation notice appears on the front of the letter along 
with the allegedly offending language and is written in the 
same size font." Id. As to the substance of Quadramed's 
letter, the court noted that the "letter does not make an 
explicit demand for payment, but states that the defendant 
`shall offer the plaintiff an opportunity' to make payment." 
Id. Moreover, the court specifically found that the letter 
does not request payment within a time period shorter than 
 
                                4 
  
the statutory thirty-day period. Thus, the court concluded 
that the first two paragraphs of the letter did not contradict 
the third, and that "even the least sophisticated debtor 
would understand that he is being given a choice, that he 
has options. . . . Such a debtor would not be mislead or 
confused into foregoing his statutory rights." Id. at 8. 
 
Thereafter, Wilson filed a timely notice of appeal.1 The 
District Court's dismissal of this suit pursuant to 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is subject to de novo review.2 Klein v. 
General Nutrition Companies, Inc., 186 F.3d 338, 342 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 315 
(3d Cir. 1997). Accordingly, we must accept plaintiff 's 
factual allegations as true and may affirm the District 
Court only if it appears that the plaintiff cannot prove any 
set of facts entitling him to relief. Klein, 186 F.3d at 342; 
see also In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation , 90 F.3d 
696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Moreover, in 
granting Quadramed's motion to dismiss, the District Court 
also denied Wilson's cross-motion for partial summary 
judgment as to liability and for class certification. Our 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 
15 U.S.C. S 1692k(d). We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 as the District Court's Letter Order dated August 25, 1999 
dismissed all claims with respect to all parties. 
 
2. We note that the Seventh Circuit is the only court of appeals to have 
held that whether an unsophisticated consumer would be confused by 
allegedly contradictory or overshadowing language is a question of fact 
which precludes dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). See Walker v. 
National Recovery, Inc., 200 F.3d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Bartlett 
v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997)) (other citations omitted). The 
majority of courts to have considered this question have, however, held 
that this determination involves a question of law. See, e.g., Terran v. 
Kaplan, 109 F.3d 1428, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1997) (determination of 
whether language in collection letter overshadowed or contradicted 
validation notice, like interpretation of language in contracts or similar 
written documents, does not turn on the credibility of extrinsic evidence 
and, therefore, presents a question of law to be reviewed de novo); 
Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225-26 
(9th Cir. 1988); Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 33, 35 (2d Cir. 
1996). We agree with the majority that whether language in a collection 
letter contradicts or overshadows the validation notice is a question of 
law. 
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review of District Court's denial of the partial summary 
judgment motion is de novo.3 We turn now to the merits of 
this appeal. 
 
II. 
 
Although the debt collection letter here presents a close 
question, we are not convinced that the language in the 
first two paragraphs overshadows or contradicts the 
validation notice such that the "least sophisticated debtor" 
would be confused or mislead as to his rights to dispute or 
seek validation of the debt. 
 
A. 
 
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a debt 
collector is required to include the following information in 
a debt collection letter to a consumer: 
 
       (1) the amount of the debt; 
 
       (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is o wed; 
 
       (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within t hirty 
       days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of 
       the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be 
       assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 
 
       (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies th e debt 
       collector in writing within the thirty-day period that the 
       debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt 
       collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of 
       a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such 
       verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer 
       by the debt collector; and 
 
       (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written 
       request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector 
       will provide the consumer with the name and address 
       of the original creditor, if different from the current 
       creditor. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We do not reach the class certification issue raised by Wilson since we 
will affirm the District Court's dismissal of the complaint under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
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15 U.S.C. S 1692g(a). Paragraphs 3 through 5 of section 
1692g(a) contain the validation notice--the statements that 
inform the consumer how to obtain verification of the debt 
and that he has thirty days in which to do so. The Act 
further mandates the debt collector to cease all collection 
efforts if the consumer provides written notice that he or 
she disputes the debt or requests the name of the original 
creditor until the debt collector mails either the debt 
verification or creditor's name to the consumer. 15 U.S.C. 
S 1692g(b). 
 
Congress enacted the Act " `to eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices' which `contribute to the number of 
personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of 
jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.' " Miller v. 
Payco-General American Credits, Inc., 943 F.2d 482, 483-84 
(4th Cir. 1991) (quoting 15 U.S.C. SS 1692a and 1692e). 
Moreover, the debt validation provisions of section 1692g 
were included by Congress to guarantee that consumers 
would receive adequate notice of their rights under the law. 
Id. at 484 (citing S. Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 
8, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1695, 
1699, 1702). 
 
Thus, in order to comply with the requirements of section 
1692g, more is required than the mere inclusion of the 
statutory debt validation notice in the debt collection letter 
--the required notice must also be conveyed effectively to 
the debtor. Id. (citing Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit 
Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1224 (9th Cir. 1988)); see also 
Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1991). 
Moreover, the validation notice required by the FDCPA "is 
to be interpreted from the perspective of the `least 
sophisticated debtor.' " Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111 (citing 
Baker v. G.C. Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 
1982)). 
 
Although we have not expounded upon the definition of 
the "least sophisticated debtor," other courts of appeals 
which have adopted that standard have. See, e.g., Savino v. 
Computer Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1998); Russell v. 
Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34-35 (2d Cir. 1996); United 
States v. National Financial Serv., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 
(4th Cir. 1996); Smith v. Computer Credit, Inc. , 167 F.3d 
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1052, 1054 (6th Cir. 1999); and Terran v. Kaplan , 109 F.3d 
1428, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1997). In Russell, the court of 
appeals ruled that a validation notice "is overshadowing or 
contradictory if it would make the least sophisticated 
consumer uncertain as to her rights." 74 F.3d at 35. The 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit elaborated that a 
collection letter "is deceptive when it can be reasonably 
read to have two or more different meanings, one of which 
is inaccurate." Id. 
 
As the court of appeals explained in Smith, the "least 
sophisticated debtor" standard is " `lower than simply 
examining whether particular language would deceive or 
mislead a reasonable debtor.' " 167 F.3d at 1054 (quoting 
Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 
1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1988) (demand for payment within 10 
days and threatening debtor's credit rating if not paid was 
found to conflict directly with statutory validation 
requirements)). In choosing the "least sophisticated debtor" 
standard, another court of appeals has observed that this 
standard "comports with basic consumer-protection 
principles" enumerated by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit as follows: 
 
       The basic purpose of the least-sophisticated-consumer 
       standard is to ensure that the FDCPA protects all 
       consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd. This 
       standard is consistent with the norms that courts have 
       traditionally applied in consumer-protection law. . . . 
 
National Financial Services, 98 F.3d at 136 (quoting Clomon 
v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993)). Thus, 
although this standard protects naive consumers, it also 
"prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations 
of collection notices by preserving a quotient of 
reasonableness and presuming a basic level of 
understanding and willingness to read with care." Id. (citing 
Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319). 
 
Applying the "least sophisticated debtor" standard, we 
noted in Graziano that "the notice must be in print 
sufficiently large to be read, and must be sufficiently 
prominent to be noticed." 950 F.2d at 111 (citing Swanson, 
869 F.2d at 1225). For example, a collection letter will not 
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meet the requirements of the Act where the validation 
notice is printed on the back and the front of the letter does 
not contain any reference to the notice, or one in which the 
validation notice is overshadowed or contradicted by 
accompanying messages or notices from the debt collector. 
Id.; Miller, 943 F.2d at 484 (citations omitted). 
 
In Graziano, the debt collector was an attorney who 
maintained a debt collection practice. The attorney sent 
Graziano a notice of a delinquent debt which included the 
required statements under section 1692g(a). The letter also 
threatened legal action unless the debt was resolved within 
10 days. The validation notice was printed on the reverse 
side of the document; however, a statement appeared at the 
bottom of the front page as follows: "See reverse side for 
information regarding your legal rights!" We held that a 
reasonable probability existed that "the least sophisticated 
debtor, faced with a demand for payment within ten days 
and a threat of immediate legal action if payment is not 
made in that time, would be induced to overlook his 
statutory right to dispute the debt within thirty days." Id. 
(citing Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225-26). Thus, we concluded 
that a notice of rights is not effectively communicated to the 
debtor when it is presented in conjunction with a 
contradictory demand such as the one in Graziano. 
 
B. 
 
Wilson argues that the first two paragraphs of 
Quadramed's letter overshadow and contradict the 
validation notice set forth in the third paragraph. In 
support of his argument, Wilson submits that the language 
in Quadramed's letter is no less demanding and 
contradictory than the debt collection letters found to have 
violated the Act in Graziano, Savino, Miller, and Rabideau v. 
Management Adjustment Bureau, 805 F.Supp. 1086 (W.D. 
N.Y. 1992). Moreover, Wilson proffers three district court 
decisions in support of his argument that a violation of 
section 1692g may still be found even though the words, 
"demand," "insist," or "command" are not used in a 
collection letter, so long as the letters lead the least 
sophisticated consumer to believe that "immediate 
payment" must be made to avoid further action. See 
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Jenkins v. Union Corp., 999 F.Supp. 1120, 1132-33 (N.D. 
Ill. 1998) (collectively, the language "URGENT," "assigned to 
our agency for immediate collection," and the" `strong' 
recommendation to contact the creditor to arrange for 
payment," overshadowed the validation notice by creating a 
confusing impression of urgency); Adams v. Law Offices of 
Stuckert & Yates, 926 F.Supp. 521, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1996) 
(debt collector misrepresented the nature of the consumer's 
rights under the Act by raising the possibility of both a 
lawsuit and damage to the debtor's credit rating in the 
absence of "prompt payment" and warning debtor to pay 
"immediately" in order to "avoid trouble"); and Velliard v. 
Mednick, 24 F.Supp.2d 863, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (court 
found language stating creditor "shows this obligation to be 
due immediately" was the same as stating "make payment 
immediately" and therefore created confusion as to what 
would happen if debtor disputed validity of the debt).4 
 
We find that, contrary to Wilson's argument, the 
collection letter did not violate section 1692g of the Act for 
the reason that the first two paragraphs of the collection 
letter neither overshadow nor contradict the validation 
notice. First of all, upon review of the physical 
characteristics and form of the letter, we have concluded 
that the first two paragraphs of the letter do not 
overshadow the validation notice. The validation notice was 
presented in the same font, size and color type-face as the 
first two paragraphs of the letter. Moreover, the required 
notice was set forth on the front page of the letter 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Both Jenkins and Velliard followed the Seventh Circuit's decision in 
Bartlett v. Heibl, 128 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1997). In Bartlett, the court of 
appeals undertook a "confusion" analysis to determine whether an 
unsophisticated debtor would be misled by the language in the collection 
letter. The court explained that there were three possible means of 
inducing confusion: (1) an actual contradiction; (2) overshadowing; and 
(3) the "failure to explain an apparent though not actual contradiction"-- 
the third means being the most common. 128 F.3d at 500. The court 
gave an example of the third type of confusion: where the letter both 
demands payment within thirty days and explains the consumer's right 
to demand validation within thirty days, confusion will result if the 
letter 
does not also explain how these two rights fit together. Id. Bartlett is 
not 
dispositive here since we have not found an actual contradiction, 
overshadowing, or an apparent contradiction. 
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immediately following the two paragraphs that Wilson 
contends overshadow and contradict the validation notice. 
Accordingly, Wilson's overshadowing claim must fail. 
 
Second, an actual or apparent contradiction between the 
first two paragraphs and the third one containing the 
validation notice does not exist here.5  Unlike the collection 
letter in Graziano, which demanded payment within ten 
days and threatened immediate legal action if payment was 
not made in that time, Quadramed's letter makes no such 
demand or threat. Instead, Wilson is presented with two 
options: (1) an opportunity to pay the debt immediately and 
avoid further action, or (2) notify Quadramed within thirty 
days after receiving the collection letter that he disputes the 
validity of the debt. As written, the letter does not 
emphasize one option over the other, or suggest that Wilson 
forego the second option in favor of immediate payment. 
Thus, we find the least sophisticated debtor would not be 
induced to overlook his statutory right to dispute the debt 
within thirty days. 
 
In so holding, we reject Wilson's argument that the 
statement "afford[ing him] an opportunity to pay 
immediately and avoid further action" is the equivalent of 
demanding payment within a period of less than thirty 
days. Indeed, in Burns v. Accelerated Bureau of Collections 
of Virginia, Inc., 828 F.Supp. 475, 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993), 
the district court found the request for payment 
information did not overshadow the validation notice, nor 
did it contain any information that directly conflicted with 
the validation notice. The language of the collection letter 
that the debtor claimed violated the Act stated: 
 
       THE ABOVE ACCOUNT HAS BEEN LISTED WITH THIS 
       AGENCY FOR IMMEDIATE COLLECTION. TIME IS OF 
       THE ESSENCE. THEREFORE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT 
       PAYMENT IN FULL FOR $3,547.46 BE MADE TODAY. 
 
Id. at 476. The request for payment in Burns was 
immediately followed by two paragraphs setting forth the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Because we find that a contradiction, either actual or apparent, does 
not exist between the first two paragraphs and the third one, a 
reconciling statement, as required in Bartlett , is not needed here. 
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validation notice, in slightly smaller type. The court found 
that the request for payment did not contain a time limit. 
Id. at 477. The court further found that the words "time is 
of the essence" and "today" did not conflict with the thirty- 
day time period, but merely communicated to the debtor 
that the debt collector was interested in collecting the debt 
in a timely fashion. Id. The court thus concluded that not 
even the least sophisticated debtor would be mislead as to 
his rights by the letter. Id. 
 
Quadramed's letter is similar to the one in Burns which 
was found not to have violated the Act. Both letters 
contained the validation notice on the front of the letter 
immediately following the contested language. Moreover, 
Quadramed's use of the word "immediately" was similarly 
used to convey its interest in collecting the debt in a timely 
fashion. We do not believe the least sophisticated debtor 
would interpret "afford you the opportunity to pay this bill 
immediately" as a demand for payment in less than thirty 
days, especially since this "opportunity" is followed, almost 
immediately, by the required notice of the right to dispute 
the debt. 
 
In addition to Graziano, Quadramed's letter is 
distinguishable from the collection letters at issue in 
Savino, Miller, Rabideau, and Swanson, which were found 
to violate the Act because they contained "screaming" 
headlines or demands for payment within a period of less 
than thirty days. In Savino, the allegedly misleading 
language in the debt collection letter read as follows: "The 
hospital insists on immediate payment or a valid reason for 
your failure to make payment." Beneath the text of the 
letter appeared the following notice: "PLEASE SEE 
IMPORTANT NOTICE ON BACK." The validation information 
required under section 1692g was set forth in this notice on 
the back of the letter. The court of appeals concluded that 
the debt collector's letter "violate[d] the FDCPA because the 
language on the front of the [letter], when read in 
conjunction with the statutory debt validation on the 
reverse side, would `make the least sophisticated consumer 
uncertain as to her rights.' " 164 F.3d at 85 (citing Russell 
v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996)). In 
reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals emphasized 
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that the debt collector's request for immediate payment did 
not, standing alone, violate the Act. Id. at 85-86. The 
violation of the Act consisted, rather, of the debt collector's 
decision to ask for immediate payment without also 
explaining that its demand did not override the consumer's 
rights under section 1692g to seek verification of the debt. 
Id. at 86. 
 
The letter in Savino is distinguishable from Quadramed's 
letter in two important respects: (1) the debt collector 
"insists on immediate payment" and (2) the least 
sophisticated debtor could easily overlook his statutory 
right to dispute the debt because the required validation 
notice appeared on the back of the letter and all that the 
debtor is told on the front is to "[p]lease see important 
notice on back." No indication is given on the front of the 
letter as to the nature of the notice, i.e., the debtor's rights. 
The language insisting on payment in the Savino  letter 
clearly overshadows the validation notice and would 
mislead the least sophisticated consumer into foregoing his 
statutory right to dispute the debt. 
 
In Miller, the collection letter stated as follows. Across the 
top of the page and in red, boldfaced type appeared, 
"DEMAND FOR PAYMENT." In the middle of the page in 
red, boldfaced type appeared, "THIS IS A DEMAND FOR 
IMMEDIATE FULL PAYMENT OF YOUR DEBT," followed by, 
in black boldfaced type, "YOUR SERIOUSLY PAST DUE 
ACCOUNT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO US FOR IMMEDIATE 
ACTION. YOU HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO PAY YOUR 
DEBT, BUT YOU HAVE NOT. IF THERE IS A VALID 
REASON, PHONE US . . . TODAY. IF NOT, PAY US -- 
 
NOW." 943 F.2d at 483. The word "NOW" covered the 
bottom one-third of the page in white letters against a red 
background. At the bottom of the page, in very small (one- 
eighth of an inch) type, white letters against a red 
background, appeared, "NOTICE: SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR 
IMPORTANT INFORMATION." Id. The validation notice was 
contained in the notice on the reverse side. 
 
The court of appeals held that the language in the Miller 
collection letter both contradicted and overshadowed the 
required validation notice, thereby preventing effective 
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communication of the notice. Id. at 484. The court further 
opined that the emphasis in the collection letter on 
"immediate" action contradicts the thirty-day period under 
the Act to dispute the debt. The court found that a 
consumer who received this collection letter could easily be 
confused between commands to respond "immediately," 
"now," and "today," and the thirty-day response period 
provided by the Act. The court concluded that "[s]creaming 
headlines, bright colors and huge lettering `all point to a 
deliberate policy on the part of the collector to evade the 
spirit of the notice statute, and mislead the debtor into 
disregarding the notice.' " Id. (quoting Ost v. Collection 
Bureau, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 701, 703 (D.N.D. 1980)). The 
offending language in the Miller letter, as well as the format, 
could not be more different from the Quadramed letter. 
 
In Rabideau, two collection letters gave rise to a claimed 
violation of the Act. The first letter contained the following 
language: 
 
       REFERRAL. YOUR CREDITOR HAS REFERRED YOUR 
       ACCOUNT TO OUR COLLECTION AGENCY FOR 
       IMMEDIATE COLLECTION. THIS IS A DEMAND FOR 
       PAYMENT IN FULL TODAY. TO AVOID FURTHER 
       CONTACT, RETURN THE BOTTOM SECTION OF THIS 
       NOTICE WITH YOUR FULL PAYMENT TODAY! TO 
       DISCUSS THIS DEMAND, CALL THE NUMBER LISTED 
       BELOW. 
 
805 F.Supp. at 1089. At the bottom of the front page was 
a detachable coupon to be enclosed for payment. 
Underneath the coupon, the following statement appeared: 
"SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR IMPORTANT INFORMATION." Id. 
at 1089-90. The validation notice was printed on the 
reverse side in a light grey ink on a light shade of grey 
computer paper, making it difficult to read, and in a type 
size less than 1/10" in size. The front of the letter was 
printed in a bolder type. The second letter in Rabideau 
contained the following statements: 
 
       SECOND NOTICE. YOU HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY 
       NOTIFIED TO CLEAR THE BALANCE. TO AVOID 
       FURTHER COLLECTION MEASURES, YOUR 
       REMITTANCE IN FULL MUST BE IN THIS OFFICE 
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       WITHIN (5) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE. 
       SHOULD WE NOT HEAR FROM YOU, WE WILL 
       ADVISE THE CREDITOR THAT YOU HAVE REFUSED 
       TO PAY. 
 
Id. at 1090. 
 
The district court in Rabideau held that the demand for 
immediate payment in both of the collection letters 
overshadowed and contradicted the validation notice. Id. at 
1094. The court held that the language in the first letter, 
"that immediate payment will avoid further contact," is 
contradictory to the statutory thirty-day period and a 
misleading statement because immediate payment is not 
the only step which may then be taken by the debtor to 
avoid further contact. Id. With regard to the second letter, 
the language demanding payment within five days of receipt 
of the letter required the debtor to respond before the 
expiration of the thirty-day period in violation of the Act. 
Thus, the court concluded that by demanding immediate 
payment without adequate notice of the debtor's right to 
dispute the underlying debt, the collection letters 
contradicted the validation notice contained in the letter. Id. 
(citing our decision in Graziano, supra ). It is important to 
note, however, that the court also held that the form of the 
validation notice in Rabideau failed to apprise the least 
sophisticated consumer adequately of the required notices. 
Id. at 1093. 
 
Just as the Savino letter encouraged the least 
sophisticated debtor to overlook his statutory rights, so too 
does the letter in Rabideau. The demand for immediate 
payment coupled with the inadequate validation notice in 
Rabideau create the confusion which misleads the least 
sophisticated debtor in violation of the Act. On the other 
hand, Quadramed's letter does not contain either an 
immediate demand for payment or an inadequate validation 
notice. 
 
In Swanson, the following language appeared in bold- 
faced type several times larger than the validation notice: 
 
       IF THIS ACCOUNT IS PAID WITHIN THE NEXT 10 
       DAYS IT WILL NOT BE RECORDED IN OUR MASTER 
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       FILE AS AN UNPAID COLLECTION ITEM. A GOOD 
       CREDIT RATING-- IS YOUR MOST VALUABLE ASSET. 
869 F.2d at 1225. The standard validation notice 
immediately followed this statement in small, standard-face 
type. The court of appeals found this notice to be 
misleading in both form and content. In this regard, the 
court of appeals explained: 
 
       The required debt validation notice is placed at the very 
       bottom of the form in small, ordinary face type, 
       dwarfed by a bold faced, underlined message three 
       times the size which dominates the center of the page. 
       More importantly, the substance of the language 
       stands in threatening contradiction to the text of the 
       debt validation notice. The prominence and message of 
       the "master file" and "most valuable asset" language, 
       lead the least sophisticated debtor, and quite probably 
       even the average debtor, only to one conclusion: he 
       must ignore his right to take 30 days to verify his debt 
       and act immediately or he will be remembered as a 
       deadbeat in the "master file" of his local collection 
       agency and will, accordingly, lose his "most valuable 
       asset," his good credit rating. 
 
Id. at 1225-26. Because the letter in Swanson invoked a 
shorter response period and promised harm to the debtor if 
the debt remained unpaid after ten days, the court of 
appeals held that the letter violated section 1692g as it 
"represent[ed] an attempt `on the part of the collection 
agency to evade the spirit of the notice statute and mislead 
the debtor into disregarding the [required debt validation] 
notice.' " Id. at 1226 (quoting Ost, 493 F.Supp. at 703). We 
do not find any similarity between the letter in Swanson 
and the letter in this case. 
 
C. 
 
Quadramed's letter is more closely analogous to the 
collection letters in Burns, supra, Terran v. Kaplan, 109 
F.3d 1428 (9th Cir. 1997), and Vasquez v. Gertler & Gertler, 
Ltd., 987 F.Supp. 652 (N.D. Ill. 1997), which were found 
not to have overshadowed or contradicted the validation 
notice. In Terran, the debtor received a collection letter 
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containing the following language: "Please be advised that 
this office represents MONTGOMERY WARD CREDIT CORP 
with whom you have an outstanding balance. . . . Unless 
an immediate telephone call is made to J. SCOTT . . ., we 
may find it necessary to recommend to our client that they 
proceed with legal action." 109 F.3d at 1430. A validation 
notice follows in the same size print. 
 
In holding that the collection letter did not violate the 
FDCPA, the Terran court held the request that the alleged 
debtor immediately telephone a collection assistant did not 
overshadow the language in the validation notice which 
provided that the alleged debtor had thirty days to dispute 
the debt. Id. at 1434. The court also noted that emphasis 
was not placed on any particular statement except the 
creditor's name and the name of the person to contact. 
Moreover, the court found particularly significant the fact 
that the challenged language does not require payment 
"immediately," but merely requests a phone call. Id. The 
court went on to note that a letter requesting the debtor 
telephone the collection agency does not contradict the 
thirty-day validation notice. According to the court, "[t]his 
language simply encourages the debtor to communicate 
with the debt collection agency. It does not threaten or 
encourage the least sophisticated debtor to waive his 
statutory right to challenge the validity of the debt." Id. 
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Terran court noted that 
every court of appeals case to have found a violation of 
section 1692g in which the least sophisticated debtor 
standard was applied involved a written communication 
containing language which demanded payment within a 
time period less than the statutory thirty-day period and 
the demand was communicated in a format that 
emphasized the duty to make payment and obscured the 
fact that the debtor had thirty days to dispute the debt. Id. 
at 1433 (citing National Fin. Servs., 98 F.3d at 139; Russell, 
74 F.3d at 34; Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111; and Miller, 943 
F.2d at 484). 
 
Turning to Vasquez, we observe that the collection letter 
there, after advising the debtor that the writer was retained 
by the creditor to collect a debt from him, set forth the 
required statutory thirty-day validation notice. After the 
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validation notice, the letter contained the following 
statement: "Kindly let me have your immediate attention 
and cooperation by sending me your payment or contacting 
me without further delay." 987 F.Supp. at 655. The district 
court did not find any violation of section 1692g for the 
following reasons: 
 
       First, there is no direct contradiction -- nothing 
       demands payment or any other action within a period 
       shorter than thirty days. Nor does the letter contain 
       language that "overshadows" the notice by threatening 
       ominous action if Vasquez doesn't act quickly. There is 
       not even an apparent contradiction that fails to explain 
       how the thirty-day right to demand verificationfits 
       together with a creditor's rights. Instead, the letter 
       begins with the verification notice, right on the front of 
       the letter, and does not hide it with an obscure 
       reference to the reverse side of the letter, bury the 
       notice in small print, or encourage its disregard in any 
       way. 
 
Id. at 657 (internal citations omitted). In contrast, the court 
noted that the letter asked for the debtor's immediate 
attention, a request that has never been found to violate 
section 1692g. Id. Thus, "[i]nstead of demanding conduct 
that is inconsistent with the debtor's thirty-day verification 
rights," the court found that the letter "simply provides the 
debtor with a possible course of action: payment (with no 
specified time limit) or contact (also with no time limit)." Id. 
 
Like the letters in Terran and Vasquez , Quadramed's 
letter does not threaten or encourage the least 
sophisticated debtor to waive his statutory right to 
challenge the validity of the debt. Similarly, the letter here 
does not demand payment within a period of less than 
thirty days and the manner of presentation does not 
undercut or overshadow the message of the validation 
notice. 
 
We are not persuaded to find a violation of section 1692g 
here based on the holdings in Jenkins v. Union Corp., 
Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & Yates, or Velliard v. 
Mednick, as Wilson suggests. All of these cases are 
distinguishable factually and therefore inapposite. The 
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letters in both Jenkins and Velliard involved overshadowing 
language which the district courts found created confusion 
as to the debtor's right to dispute the debt. The Quadramed 
letter does not create such confusion. The letter in Adams 
misrepresented the nature of the consumer's rights under 
the Act by raising the possibility of both a lawsuit and 
damage to the debtor's credit rating in the absence of 
"prompt" payment and warning the debtor to pay 
"immediately" in order to "avoid trouble." In this case, the 
letter does not contain any such threats which would 
overshadow the validation notice.6 Accordingly, we reject 
Wilson's argument to the contrary. 
 
We hold, therefore, that neither the form nor the 
substance of Quadramed's letter overshadowed or 
contradicted the validation notice. Accordingly, as a matter 
of law, we do not find any violation of section 1692g of the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act based on the facts 
presented here. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court dismissing the complaint 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and denying Wilson's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In determining the urgency of a demand for payment, courts have 
considered the nature of the threats of future action if payment is not 
made within the demand period. For example, general threats of future 
action against the debtor for nonpayment do not convey the same 
urgency and pressure upon the debtor to pay as threats of immediate 
legal action, reporting the debtor to the credit bureau, or causing a 
negative credit rating. See, e.g., Adams v. Law Offices of Stuckert & 
Yates, 926 F.Supp. 521, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Where specific action is 
threatened for nonpayment, the least sophisticated debtor might feel that 
he has no other option but to pay, in which case such threats have been 
found to overshadow the validation notice and cause the debtor to 
overlook his statutory right to dispute the debt. Wefind the language in 
Quadramed's letter, "avoid further action," does not convey a sense of 
urgency or a threat of specific action which overshadows the validation 
notice. Accordingly, we find the least sophisticated debtor in this case 
would not feel pressured to overlook his statutory right to dispute the 
validity of the debt after reading Quadramed's letter. 
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motion for partial summary judgment and for class 
certification. 
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